We study multi-unit auctions where each bidder has a private value for each unit, and a private budget which is the total amount of money she can spend. We propose a mechanism which is semi-truthful, i.e. the only way that a bidder can possibly benefit from lying is by overstating her value (i.e., it is a weakly dominant strategy for agents to state their true budgets and not understate their values). We prove that some equilibrium of the proposed mechanism optimizes the revenue over all Pareto-optimal mechanisms. We show that every equilibrium of the mechanism, under some natural assumptions, differs by at most the budget of one bidder from this optimum revenue. Finally, we show that a natural greedy bidding strategy in the repeated version of the mechanism converges to an equilibrium that generates optimal revenue.
Introduction
Multi-unit auctions have been studied comprehensively in microeconomics and auction theory literature [AC95] [Wol98] [Nau95] . However, the problem of budget-constrained bidders has been paid surprisingly little attention, despite of the fact that in practice, bidders face natural budget constraints. As an example, an important type of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders is sponsored search and contextual auctions [BCI + 05] where advertisers normally submit their bids for each query and the total monthly advertising budget. Then it is the auctioneer's (e.g. Google, or Yahoo!) job to allocate slots and decide the pricing such that no advertiser has to pay more than her monthly budget.
One reason the budget constraints have not received much attention is the technical difficulty that the utility of obtaining the items is compared to the total price at which the items are procured to give a net payoff. Perhaps because of this, the theoretical framework of budget-constrained auctions is currently substantially less well-developed than that of unconstrained auctions. This is unsatisfactory both from a theoretical viewpoint, and from the practical viewpoint, where the absence of appropriate framework might potentially result in losses in revenue and efficiency.
Model
In this paper we study multi-unit auctions with budget limits. We suppose there are m identical divisible 1 units of a single item for sale. Each bidder i has a private value v i for each unit, and a private budget limit b i on the total amount she may pay. We assume that bidder i's utility from acquiring x i units and paying price p i is u i = x i v i − p i as long as the price is within budget: p i ≤ b i , and is negative infinity if p i > b i . (i.e. the budget constraint is hard. Note that this is the assumption that may be considered unnatural in the more usual quasi-linear utility maximization models.)
Throughout the paper, for simplicity of description we always assume there exist a bidder with value ε and budget mε (she has enough money to buy all the items with her value). As ε tends to zero, the revenue of this modified instance approaches that of the original, and hence this assumption is without loss of generality.
Our Contributions
1. We propose a new mechanism, called Sort-Cut, for selling all the units. In the SortCut mechanism, no agent can benefit from lying about her budget. However, some people may increase their revenue by lying about their value, but only by overstating their value. We show that the allocation of the Sort-Cut mechanism is Pareto-optimal (defined formally later); hence, it is nearly the best possible result that can be obtained for this problem since the recent result of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [DLN08] shows that there is no truthful Pareto-optimal deterministic 2 mechanism for this problem.
2.
We also obtain an upper-bound R * (which coincides with the revenue of ascending price auction for truthful bids) for the revenue of any Pareto-optimal mechanism and then show that if the sum of budgets of all bidders is at least twice of R * , this upperbound is achievable by Sort-Cut mechanism.
3. Assuming reasonable behavior of the bidders (defined as rational bidding in definition 4), we show that any equilibrium of Sort-Cut has a revenue of at least R * −b max where b max is the maximum budget among the winners, and prove this bound is tight for all Pareto-optimal mechanisms which are budget-truthful (bidders can not benefit from lying about their budgets).
4. Finally, we study the dynamics of the auction and show that under some natural assumptions, the unique equilibrium of the game is the one that maximizes the revenue (attains revenue R * ). The equilibrium turns out to be the same as the outcome of ascending price auction in which bidders are bidding truthfully.
Previous Work
The problem of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders was initiated by Borgs et al. in [BCI + 05]. Our model is identical to theirs. They introduce a truthful mechanism that is asymptotically revenue-maximizing; however, it may leave some units unsold. The idea is to group the people randomly into two groups, and use the market clearing price of each group as an offering price to the other group. A second paper that uses the same model is by Abrams [Abr06] . It basically uses the same idea of [BCI + 05] but with some improvements. The proposed mechanism may still leave some units unsold.
Another recent paper that analyzes this problem by Dobzinsky et al. [DLN08] , mainly proves an impossibility result. They first assume that budgets of all players are publicly known. Then they give a truthful mechanism which solves the problem under this assumption. Their mechanism is a direct application of Ausubel's auction [Aus04] . They define the demand of each bidder at any time to be her budget (which is assumed to be publicly known) divided by the current price of Ausubel's clock auction. The demand is defined to be zero for bidders who have values lower than the current price. With respect to this demand function, they allocate the units and define the prices using Ausubel's clock auction. Then they show that this mechanism is the unique mechanism which is both truthful and Pareto-optimal under the assumption of publicly known budgets. Finally by showing that their mechanism is not truthful if the budgets are private knowledge, they conclude that no mechanism for this problem can be both truthful and Pareto-optimal.
Both [BCI + 05] and [DLN08] argue that lack of quasi-linearity (because of hard budget constraints) is the most important difficulty of the problem. Still some papers have tried to solve the problem by relaxing hard budget constraints [Mas00] , or modeling the budget constraint as an upper bound on the value obtained by the bidder rather than her payment [MSVV07] . It has been shown [BCI + 05] that modeling budget constraints with quasi-linear functions can lead to arbitrarily bad revenue.
Another paper that has studied budget constraints, mainly for advertisement auctions, is the work of Feldman et al. [FMNP08] . They give a truthful mechanism for ad auctions with budget-constrained advertisers where there are multiple slots available for each query, and an advertiser cannot appear in more than one slot per query. Their work is related to our work because they also consider the game-theoretic aspects of the problem. However, the utility function that they use is very different from ours. In [FMNP08] they define advertisers to be click-maximizers, while in our model, advertisers are profit-maximizers. Other papers that have considered budgets in auctions include [AM04] , [BK98] , [CG96] . However, [AM04] only considers the offline optimization problem and does not study the game theoretic aspects of the problem. They also model budget constraints by value functions of the bidders, which means bidders are not willing to get value more than their budget. In [BK98] , they study an auction for selling two single items to budget-constrained bidders. They mainly focus on the effect of bidding aggressively on an unwanted item with the purpose of depleting other bidders budget. Similar situation happens in our model too, but the focus of our work is generally very different from theirs. Another paper [CG96] compares first-price and all-pay auctions in a budget-constrained setting and show that the expected payoff of allpay auctions is better under some assumptions. However, they do not consider multi-unit items, and do not propose any new mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our proposed mechanism and show some examples of how it works. In section 3 we show that our mechanism is close to a truthful mechanism by proving that it is weakly dominant for the bidders to tell the truth about their budget and not to understate their values. Then in section 4 we use a proposition of [DLN08] to prove the Pareto-optimality of Sort-Cut mechanism. We step into revenue analysis in section 5 by proving some theorems which state Sort-Cut mechanism is almost revenue optimal. Finally, in Section 6 we show that if bidders use a natural greedy algorithm for bidding, the only equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game is revenue optimal. We conclude our work and introduce some possible extensions in section 7.
Sort-Cut mechanism Description
In this section we describe how our mechanism allocates the units, and how each bidder is charged. Without loss of generality, assume that v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ . . . v n . The algorithm assigns some units to the bidders 1 through k, and assigns nothing to the bidders k + 1 through n. (We describe later how we determine k) The bidders 1, . . . , k − 1 must have exhausted almost (we will define what we mean by almost) all their budget, and bidder k may be left with some money from her budget b k . Bidders k + 1, . . . , n do not pay anything.
Suppose that the money left for bidder k is b ′ k , and define
(c i denotes the number of units that bidder i can buy according to her value for one unit.) Now we charge bidder i (for i < k) for the first c k items that she wins a price of v k , for the next c k+1 items that she wins a price of v k+1 , for the next c k+2 items that she wins a price v k+2 and so on until her remaining budget cannot buy the next whole item (At this point, her budget is almost exhausted). For bidder k, we start charging her a price of v k+1 for the first c k+1 items that she gets, v k+2 for the next c k+2 items that she gets and so on until she has exhausted all her allocated spending budget of b k − b ′ k . We give each bidder i (i < k) as many units as she can afford according to our pricing and her budget. The only point that needs to be cleared here, is how we determine k, and b ′ k (the money which is left for the last winner), because they play an important role in our pricing mechanism. If the index k is very large (close to n), then the prices for the units will be very low and the number of units that each winner can afford increases, also the number of winners is large, that results in shortage of supply. On the other hand, if k is chosen very small (close to 1), we have few winners, and relatively high prices, so a number of units will be left unsold. We seek to find the right point which determines bidder k and the amount of money b ′ k left for her, such that the market clears at this point.
To be more precise, define B = n i=1 b i . We are looking for a breakpoint (boundary)
that determines for us both k and b ′ k . We want to sell all items. We must also guarantee that the bidders 1, ..., k−1 (which are determined by x) do not have enough budget to buy any additional item. As we increase x, the prices decrease, the number of winners and items demanded to be allocated increases, and consequently the demand increases. We can find the solution by slowly increasing x from 0 until the demand becomes equal to supply. In other words, we increase x until the total number of units that bidders 1 through k want (assuming that bidder k can use only b k − b ′ k of her budget) becomes equal to the units that we have to sell. Algorithmically, we can use a simple binary search for finding the right value for x.
Finally, to keep the bidders from overstating their budget, we add the following to SortCut. Suppose that the Sort-Cut mechanism wants to charge a bidder i an amount equal to p i , and her announced budget is b i . Instead of charging her p i , we charge her b i with probability p i /b i and 0 otherwise. In this way, if somebody overstates her budget, she is accepting the risk of paying more than her budget which makes her expected utility equal to minus infinity (this is because we have hard budget constraints). To make the situation more practical, even if we get into this process with probability ε, and simply charge the bidder p i in the rest of the cases, still bidders can not take the risk of overstating their budget. We continue our binary search with x = 138. Now, k = 3 and b ′ 3 = 155 − 138 = 17. c 3 = 2 and c 4 = 5. The price of the first unit, the second unit, and ... that each winner wins (for bidders 1 and 2) is 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, ε, ε, . . .. Therefore, the demand of the first bidder according to this pricing scheme is x 1 = m, which means nothing will be left for the second bidder. This situation shows that x is too large for the breakpoint, so we have to continue our binary search with x = 115.
By continuing the binary search, after trying values x = 115, x = 128, x = 122, x = 119, x = 121 we finally end up with the following pricing and allocation. x = 121, k = 3, b ′ 3 = 34, x 1 = 8, p 1 = 52, x 2 = 11 and p 2 = 58. The prices of the first unit, second unit, ... for the first two bidders are: 7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, ε, ε, .... If the reader has not followed all the details for this example, it is instructive at least to apply the mechanism for the values of x = 120 and x = 122 to see how the value of x = 121 gives the clearing point.
Example 2 Another example of Sort-Cut mechanism behavior is when there is only one unit for sale (i.e. m = 1). In this case, suppose that j is the smallest index such that there exists some i < j with b i ≥ v j . (Note that j always exists, because we have added a dummy bidder with value ε to the set of bidders). Now, take i the smallest index with b i ≥ v j . The mechanism assigns the single unit to bidder i with price v j . A special case of this example is when bidders do not have budget constraints. In that case, Sort-Cut mechanism is equivalent to the second price auction.
Although we first described above the Sort-Cut mechanism for indivisible units, we will henceforth assume that the units are divisible. Note that in the divisible case, we will require that for the bidders j < k, all their budget is spent while for bidder k all but b ′ k is spent. The divisibility assumption helps us to understand Sort-Cut mechanism more easily.
Example 3
In this example, we use the same numbers as in example 1 but here for the case of divisible units. We start with x = 128, so k = 3 and b ′ 3 = 27. This means that the price of each unit (for the first two bidders) is 7 for the first 27 that they spend, and after that for the next 30 that they spend, the price for each unit is reduced to 6, and finally, after that the price is ε for each unit. Therefore, the first bidder can afford x 1 = 27/7+28/6 units with a total price of 55. But the second bidder can afford all the remaining units now (which means nothing will be left for the third bidder, who must be assigned something according to our breakpoint). x 2 = 27/7 + 30/6 + 3/ε. This means that x is too large for the breakpoint.
Our next guess is x = 122, so k = 3 and b ′ 3 = 33. Here, the price (for the first two bidders) is 7 per unit for the first 33 that they spend, and 6 per unit for the next 30 that they spend, and ε per unit after that. Therefore, the first bidder can afford x 1 = 33/7 + 22/6 and the second bidder can afford x 2 = 33/7 + 27/6 units. The third bidder can use 7 of her money and she has to pay 6 per unit for the first 30 that she spends. Therefore, she can afford x 3 = 7/6 units. We can see that x 1 + x 2 + x 3 < m, therefore, x is too small for the breakpoint.
By continuing the same procedure, we will see that x ≃ 123.11 is the right value for x. Therefore, x 1 ≃ 8.4, x 2 ≃ 9.25 and x 3 ≃ 1.35, and the prices they pay are p 1 = 55, p 2 = 60 and p 3 ≃ 8.11.
We now present the formal description of the mechanism for divisible units. i.
8. Otherwise, return the current pricing and allocation as the solution.
Proposition 1 Given a set of bid values v j and budgets b j let x denote the cut point determined by running the Sort-Cut mechanism (described above) with these as input, and let k be the index of the bidder whose budget is split in the algorithm. Suppose a single bidder j understates her budget as b j − ε, and the cut point of the Sort-Cut mechanism on these new values is
Proof: The implications follow by a simple analysis of the outcome of the Sort-Cut mechanism.
In the first case j < k, since the budget of an agent who is assigned good is decreased, the market will not clear at the old value of x and there will be left over supply. Thus the new clearing point x ′ must be larger than x; Clearly, it cannot be more than the amount by which the bidder j understates her budget since the resulting changed prices will be used not only for bidder j but for all other bidders up to k.
In the second case when j = k, the left over budget b ′ k of this bidder has decreased by ε. Thus the pricing scheme for all bidders 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 has become better since the items they procure at the unit rate of v k went down by ε. With the revised price scheme, the demand from these bidders will increase. To clear the increased demand, the breakpoint x ′ will have to be less than x. As before it cannot decrease by more than ε since even one bidder faced with this increase will reduce the demand by the equivalent amount.
The case j > k is similar to the previous one since the decrease in the budget of bidder j can reduce the unit price for the agents who are assigned the item; The calculations are identical as well. 2
Semi-Truthfulness
Although Dobzinski et al. [DLN08] shows that no truthful Pareto-optimal mechanism exists for this problem, it is still interesting to know how truthful a Pareto-optimal mechanism can be. In other words, we want to know how much the bidders can benefit from lying, and how the different ways of lying can benefit them in a mechanism. There are basically four ways that a bidder can lie: overstating budget, understating budget, overstating value and understating value. In different mechanisms, bidders may take different strategies and use either of these ways to increase their utility. We show that in Sort-Cut mechanism, the only way out of these four that the bidder can use to benefit from lying is by overstating value. This result is interesting because first, we know that some kind of lying must be beneficiary for the bidders if the mechanism is Pareto-optimal, and second, among four different ways of lying, this is the most desirable one for the auctioneer -giving good revenue properties (This is formalized in Section 5). It is easy to see that the revenue of Sort-Cut mechanism is monotone with respect to the vector of bids. (i.e. if bidders increase their stated values, the revenue of the mechanism does not decrease.)
Definition 1 We say a mechanism A is semi-truthful if it is a weakly dominant strategy for the bidders to bid their real budgets and not to understate their value.
Theorem 2 Sort-Cut mechanism is semi-truthful.
Proof:
There are three cases:
1. Consider a bidder j where j ≤ k − 1. Obviously j can not benefit from overstating her value because all winners 1, ..., k − 1 have the same pricing policy. Also, she can not benefit from lying about her budget, because if she overstates her budget, she will be charged more than her budget which makes her utility minus infinity. If she understates her budget, we show that her payoff does not increase: the payoff before understating her budget is y j v j − b j , while after understating to b j − ε, it is at most
If bidder j understates her value, she may still remain among the first k − 1 bidders which does not change anything for her, or, she may go to the boundary which makes the situation trickier, or she may go below the boundary which decreases her utility. So the only case that we must handle is when she goes to the boundary.
Suppose bidder j moves to the boundary by announcing a value v ′ j ≤ v k and she spends b of her money while b ′ of her money will be remaining. (so we have b + b ′ = b j ) We know that before going to the boundary, with b ′ k of her budget she bought the units for price v k per unit, and after that she had unit prices v k+1 , .... Now when she goes to the boundary, she buys for prices v k+1 , v k+2 , ... which are lower and seem to be better for her, but as we will see, that is not the case because she is not using all her money when she is on the boundary. First note that if b ′ ≥ b ′ k , she can not benefit from going to the boundary (because previously she was using b ′ k of her budget for getting the units for price v k per unit, but now she has b ′ of her budget left unused). So we may assume b ′ < b ′ k . Now, consider bidder k to see how many units she wins after leaving the boundary. Now the bidder with value v k gets at least
units (for a price of v ′ j ) in addition to all the units that she had before (when she was on the boundary). The prices for all other winners is less than or equal to what it was before. Therefore, the number of units that bidder j wins after going to the boundary must be reduced by at least these c k units. Bidder j's costliest c k units were priced v k units each for a total price of b ′ k = c k v k . After understating her value, she is paying
k and getting at least c k units less. Thus her average price per unit has increased so this is not an improvement.
2. Now consider a bidder j where j > k. Note that this person has incentive to overstate her budget, because in this way she may increase the price for the winners, decrease their demand and probably win some units; but because overstating budget leads to paying more than real budget with some positive probability, and makes the expected utility minus infinity, bidders will never overstate their budget. It is obvious that bidder j can not benefit from understating her value, because it keeps her among the losers. However, overstating the value may be beneficial for her in some cases.
3. For the person on the boundary (j = k), it is clear that she can not benefit from understating her value, because it can not influence her price and she may even lose the units that she already wins (by reducing the price for earlier winners). Again, overstating the value may increase her utility in some cases. The argument for overstating her budget is the same as for case 2. As for understating her budget, by Proposition 1, the payoff before understating her budget is y k v k − b k , while after understating 
Pareto Optimality
Pareto optimality is simply implied by two propositions in [DLN08] . Here are the propositions for both divisible and indivisible cases: Since Sort-Cut mechanism always allocates the units in decreasing order of the values, a bidder with value v i may be allocated some units only if the bidders with higher values v j > v i cannot afford it. Therefore, the allocation of the Sort-Cut mechanism is Paretooptimal by construction. In the next lemma, we show an upper bound on the revenue of any mechanism which guarantees Pareto-optimality.
Revenue Analysis
Lemma 5 No Pareto-optimal mechanism can guarantee revenue more than R * .
Proof: Suppose that v * is the market clearing price and let l be the greatest index such that v l ≥ v * . If a mechanism A generates a revenue more that R * , it must charge some bidder i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) more than v * per unit. But if bidder i decreases her bid down to v * + ε, the mechanism still has to exhaust all her budget (otherwise, because of Pareto-optimality, it can not charge the people who have value v * or less, and consequently can not even make revenue R * ) but now with price of at most v * + ε. That means that at an equilibrium of the mechanism, no bidder can be charged more than v * per unit. 2
For the rest of this section, we want to give a lower bound for the revenue of Sort-Cut mechanism. But before that, we need to introduce the concept of Rational Bidding. 
(This is by definition of ascending price auction) Now, we are ready to prove the claim. Consider an output of the Sort-Cut mechanism. Since the revenue of Sort-Cut mechanism is less than R * and both mechanisms sell all m units, there must be some winner i who is getting the item cheaper than v * per unit. We can either have i < k or i = k. First suppose that i < k. According to our pricing scheme, bidder i has to pay at least v * per unit up to R * − R of her budget (See Figure 1) . That means if i is paying less than v * on average per unit, her budget must be more than R * − R. Therefore, b i > R * − R which implies R > R * − b max . Now consider the case where i = k. Here, bidder i is using b i − b ′ i of her budget, and she has to pay at least v * per unit up to R * − R − b ′ i of her budget. Therefore, if she pays less than v * on average per unit, the amount of her budget that she is actually using,
Note any mechanism which is truthful for the budgets (like Sort-Cut mechanism) can not guarantee a revenue higher that R * −b max . This can be shown by a simple example in which there is only one bidder. No budget-truthful mechanism can charge this bidder more than 0. Therefore, our bound of R * − b max is tight, and the best achievable in budget-truthful mechanisms.
Equilibria Analysis
In this section, we try to answer the following question: For natural repeated strategies, if the vector of bids stabilizes, at what bids can it stabilize?
We focus on simple strategies and impose some assumptions and restrictions. First, we assume that all values are common knowledge: over time, advertisers are likely to learn all relevant information about each other's values. Second, since bids can be changed at any time, stable bids must be best responses to one another. In this section, we are using the same approach that Edelman et al [EOS05] used to model the generalized second price (GSP) auctions. Like in their paper, we assume that the bidders are playing an infinitely repeated game, and use this to obtain some equilibria properties for Sort-Cut mechanism. We then take the approach of a consequent paper [CDE + 07] which shows that a natural bidding strategy played by all bidders leads to a unique Nash equilibrium of GSP, and that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the outcome of a VCG auction. Here, we show that a natural bidding strategy, called Greedy Bidding, leads to a unique equilibrium of the game which coincides with the outcome of ascending price auction; this shows the revenue optimality of the equilibrium.
Proposition 7 If we assume that revenue R * of ascending price auction for truthful bids is less than half of the total budget of all participants, i.e. 
Proof:
The following vector of bids will be a Nash equilibrium in the game of complete information. All those who have value greater than v * bid truthfully, those who have value less than v * bid v * − ε. Therefore, all those who are bidding v * − ε are the losers and will not be assigned anything, and the winners have to pay v * − ε per unit. (Note that if the last winner is partially using her budget, then v * is equal to her value, and she has utility 0. Therefore she has no incentive to increase her bid for depleting the budget of other winners.) 2 Now, we define Greedy Bidding, a simple and natural response algorithm for the bidders who are playing the infinitely repeated game without knowing anything about bids and budgets of other bidders. Then we show that the unique equilibrium of Greedy Bidding coincides with the one described above. Greedy bidding from the perspective of a bidder is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Greedy Bidding)
The bidder executes the following rules in order. Proof: First we claim that all losers have the same bid in an equilibrium. This is because if any of them bids slightly higher, she must be assigned something with a price higher than her value to send her back to her previous bid using rule 1. Because of Paretooptimality, this can happen only if they all have the same bid. Moreover, this common bid must be the highest possible, otherwise they all can increase their bid. Those who have higher value than the common bid of the losers must bid higher than the losers. Therefore, the unique solution to this greedy bidding system is when all losers are bidding slightly lower than the market clearing price and this completes the proof. 2
Conclusions and Extensions
We have introduced a new mechanism for multiple units of a single item with individual budgets and valuations, and proved some useful properties. Extending the Sort-Cut mechanism for multi-item auctions with similar desirable properties is the most important avenue for further work.
Another issue, also considered in [BCI + 05], is the definition of welfare when there are budget constraints. If we define welfare as sum of the utilities of the bidders, any reasonable mechanism can be arbitrarily bad with respect to welfare. Suppose that there is a bidder who has budget 0 and has a very large value. The mechanisms which do not allocate anything to this bidder are unboundedly bad compared to those which do. On the other hand, allocating something to a bidder who has budget 0, means giving something for free to a bidder! Therefore, we must find another way for measuring welfare rather than comparing it to a situation where all items are given to a bidder for free. This remains another important direction for future work.
